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We describe the experimental test of a quantum key distribution performed with a two-way
protocol without using entanglement. An individual incoherent eavesdropping is simulated and
induces a variable amount of noise on the communication channel. This allows a direct verification
of the agreement between theory and practice.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
One of the most attractive application of quantum me-
chanics is the quantum key distribution (QKD), which
allows for the secret sharing of correlated random data
between two (or more) users, traditionally called Alice
and Bob. Since the seminal works by Bennett and Bras-
sard [1] and Ekert [2], QKD developed into a promis-
ing field of research for near-future technology ([3]; for a
review see [4]), and both theoretical [5] and experimen-
tal [6] work has been done in order to prove its security
and feasibility. A feature of QKD is that none of the users
knows in advance the final form of the generated key. On
the contrary the secure transmission of a predetermined
key has been recently investigated through schemes that
exploit [7, 8, 9] or do not exploit [10, 11] entanglement,
and that are usually cited as deterministic, with refer-
ence to Bob’s in principle possibility of knowing with
certainty the information encoded by Alice [12].
In this Letter we present the experimental test of a
QKD realized with the two-way protocol described in
Ref. [11] and termed LM05. We simulate the noise re-
lated to a class of attacks by Eve, and by accordingly
varying it we measure all the quantities relevant to an
effective transmission of information.
The Protocol– In LM05 Bob prepares a qubit in one of
the four states |0〉, |1〉 (the Pauli Z eigenstates), |+〉, |−〉
(Pauli X eigenstates), and sends it to his counterpart
Alice. With probability c Alice uses the qubit to test the
channel noise (control mode, CM) or, with probability
1− c, she uses it to encode a bit of information (encoding
mode, EM). The CM consists in a projective measure-
ment of the qubit along a basis randomly chosen between
Z and X , followed by the preparation of a new qubit in
the same state as the outcome of the measurement. The
EM is the modification of the qubit state according to
one of the following transformations: the identity oper-
ation I , which leaves the qubit unchanged and encodes
the logical ‘0’, or iY ≡ ZX , which flips the qubit and
encodes the logical ‘1’. Alice can now send the qubit
back to Bob who measures it in the same basis he pre-
pared it; in case of an EM run this feature allows Bob to
deterministically infer Alice’s operation. After the whole
transmission Alice declares the CM and the EM runs.
Comparing the data collected during the CM the users
estimate the Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBERs) on the
forward and backward channels; we call these two ‘par-
tial’ QBERs respectively q1 and q2. Comparing a part of
the data collected during the EM the users estimate also
a third, ‘total’, QBER QAB. This quantity is not nec-
essary for the security of the protocol but proves useful
for estimating the mutual information between Alice and
Bob. As usual for a QKD the exchange of the raw key is
then followed by the procedures of error correction [13]
and privacy amplification [14].
The communication is realized exploiting linear polar-
ization states of near infrared photons. In Fig.1 is re-
ported a sketch of the experimental setup. The pho-
tons are generated by a type II down-conversion process:
a UV pump beam from a diode laser (λ = 406.5nm,
power 25mW) impinges on a 1.5mm thick BBO crys-
tal cut at an angle of 43◦. We select the intersection
of the ordinary propagating light cone and the extraor-
dinary one at an angular aperture of the two beams
around ∼ 3.5◦ [15]. The wide spectral width of the pump
beam (∆λ = 0.9nm) affects the entanglement of the two-
photon, as in the case of pulsed pump [16]; to obtain a
totally symmetrical spectrum we used an interferomet-
ric technique [17]. The two output modes of PBS1 are
launched into single mode fibers [18] at 810nm through a
pair of interference filters centered at 810nm and a band-
width of 40nm, which are used to reduce the background
light. The fibers terminate onto the sensible area of two
APD modules with quantum efficiency ∼ 70% at 810nm.
The coincidence rate is around 1000cps for single count
rate of around 12000cps. The polarization state after
the PBS1 can be expressed as |ψ〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2.
Two Glenn-Laser polarizer (GL) were inserted after the
PBS1 to verify the quality of the polarization entangle-
ment of the state. The state purity has been tested by a
tomographic reconstruction [19]. We measured an entan-
glement of formation of 0.989±0.005 [20] and a violation
of the CHSH Bell inequality of over 98 standard devi-
ations [21]. Bob prepares the qubits measuring one of
the output mode of the interferometer with a λ/2 wave-
plate (WP1), a GL and detector T. The detection of this
photon projects the other one on the desired polarization
state and serves also as trigger for the whole communica-
tion system. We note that entanglement is not necessary
for the protocol itself. This specific preparation proce-
2FIG. 1: Sketch of the experimental setup. Inset: the distri-
bution of QBER for different sets of preparation by Bob and
operation by Alice. Bob’s preparation is reported on the over-
lay, Alice’s encoding is represented by the area colour: lighter
gray for I (logical ‘0’), darker gray for iY (logical ‘1’).
dure was chosen because it can be easily extended for a
true random passive choice of the initial state using only
linear optics components. The prepared photon is then
launched into a 5m long single mode fiber at 810nm to-
wards Alice.
Alice passively switches between CM and EM via a
50/50 BS. Control mode: when Alice’s measuring ba-
sis is the same as Bob’s the coincidence clicks between
the two detectors A0 and A1 and the trigger detec-
tor T permit to estimate q1 through the usual formula:
q1 = Cerr/(C0+C1), where C0,1 is the rate of coincidence
and Cerr = C0,1 depending on Bob’s state preparation.
To complete the control mode, Alice injects an atten-
uated light pulse of definite polarization with a wave-
length of 810nm in the BS. This pulse is generated by
a pulsed diode laser (not shown in figure) with a rep-
etition rate of 80MHz, pulse width 88ps FWHM, at-
tenuated to an average number of photons per pulse of
µ = (1.20 ± 0.05)× 10−3. Encoding Mode: for encoding
the message is necessary to realize the I and the iY Pauli
operators. A couple of λ/2 waveplates (WP2,3) allows to
span all the equator of the Bloch sphere (an eventual
phase has no importance for the rest of the protocol). As
last step, the photon travels back to Bob through a dif-
ferent fiber, 5m long too. The photons sent by Alice are
eventually polarization-analyzed at Bob’s side by PBS3
and a λ/2 waveplate (WP4) set so that the photons are
measured in the same basis as they were prepared. The
photons are collected after the PBS3 into two multimode
fibers and then detected by two APD modules, B0 and
B1. During CM runs a measure of q2 is obtained in the
same way as q1 with the difference that the photons come
from the pulsed laser that also supplies a trigger signal.
Coincidence counts between B0 or B1 and the trigger T
can be associated to logical values ‘0’ or ‘1’ corresponding
to Alice encoding in the EM runs. In our experimental
tests we used all the coincidence counts to estimate QAB.
In the inset of Fig.1 is reported a typical communication
test. It consists in a direct measurement of QAB for
different state preparations performed by Bob and dif-
ferent encodings by Alice. All the eight configurations
of interest are reported. The best value we obtained for
QAB is (4.05± 0.22)× 10−2. Before every test the fibers
were aligned using two polarization control pads, one for
each fiber. The pads are set so that any polarization
input state exits almost unchanged. The usual fidelity
for the polarization state after the alignment is ∼ 96%.
The fibers proved to remain stable for quite long periods
(∼ 4h), enough for several runs after the alignment [22].
Eavesdropping– The CM of LM05 comprises the same
security test of BB84 [1], repeated twice. This gives to
the two-way LM05 at least the same security level of the
one-way BB84. Nevertheless there are indications that
the security threshold of two-way schemes can overcome
that of one-way schemes. In particular LM05 results se-
cure against individual incoherent attack (IIA) regard-
less of the noise introduced on the channel by an eaves-
dropper (Eve) [11]; on the contrary BB84 results secure
against individual attacks only if the noise threshold is
lower than ∼15% ([23], [4] Sec.VI.E). In the optimal IIA
Eve prepares two sets of ancillae ε, η and makes them
interact with the qubit: the ε’s on the forward path and
the η’s on the backward one, after Alice’s encoding stage.
By proper measure of her two sets of ancillae, Eve can
gain information about the key. There are two mutually
exclusive interactions that minimize Eve’s noise on the
channel while maximizing her gain [11]:
Z-attack:
|0〉 |ε〉 → |0〉
∣
∣εZ0
〉 |+〉 |ε〉→ |+〉
∣
∣εZ+
〉
+ |−〉
∣
∣εZ
−
〉
|1〉 |ε〉 → |1〉
∣
∣εZ1
〉 |−〉 |ε〉→ |+〉
∣
∣εZ
−
〉
+ |−〉
∣
∣εZ+
〉 (1)
X-attack:
|+〉 |ε〉 → |+〉
∣
∣εX+
〉 |0〉 |ε〉→ |0〉
∣
∣εX0
〉
+ |1〉
∣
∣εX1
〉
|−〉 |ε〉 → |−〉
∣
∣εX
−
〉 |1〉 |ε〉→ |0〉
∣
∣εX1
〉
+ |1〉
∣
∣εX0
〉 (2)
where we have introduced the states |εZ0,1〉, |εX+,−〉,
|εZ+,−〉 = [|εZ0 〉 ± |εZ1〉]/2 and |εX0,1〉 = [|εX+〉 ± |εX−〉]/2. The
Z and X indicate the basis whose eigenstates remain un-
changed under Eve’s action. The states |εZ0,1〉 and |εX+,−〉
are normalized and non orthogonal: 〈εZ0,1|εZ1,0〉 = cosφZε
and 〈εX+,−|εX−,+〉 = cosφXε , with φZ,Xε ∈ [0, π/2]. Analo-
gous expressions hold for backward propagation with η’s
ancillae in the place of ǫ’s. If Eve chooses the Z-attack,
Eqs.(1), she introduces no noise on the channel when Bob
prepares the eigenstates of the Z-basis but creates dis-
turbance in the conjugate basis X ; the same argument
applies for the X-attack, Eqs.(2). The absence of a public
basis revelation in the LM05 protocol prevents Eve from
always choosing the best attack strategy between the Z
and the X-attack. In the frame of the IIA attack an ex-
plicit functional relation among the three QBERs, q1, q2
and QAB can be found. Let us consider the expression
of the forward QBER for the Z and X-state preparation,
q1z and q1x respectively, as functions of the angles φ
Z
ε and
3φXε chosen by Eve on the forward path:
q1z = (1− cosφXε )/2 q1x = (1− cosφZε )/2 (3)
Through these relations Alice and Bob can guess Eve’s
angles φXε , φ
Z
ε from the measured quantities q1z, q1x, re-
spectively. Analogous results (with angles φXη and φ
Z
η)
hold for the partial QBERs q2z and q2x of the backward
channel. The expression of the third QBER QAB can
be derived as the average probability that Alice and Bob
find an error on the total two-way channel in the EM:
QABi = q1i + q2i − 2q1i q2i i = (x, z) (4)
This relation is suitable for direct verification since the
QBERs on the left side and those on the right side
are measured through independent processes, i.e. respec-
tively during EM and CM.
To simulate the presence of an eavesdropper we must
control the noise on the channels to generate the same ef-
fect caused by Eve’s action described in Eqs.(1) and (2).
Consider the following unitary transformation:
U
Z
φZ
ε
= cosφZε I + i sinφ
Z
ε Z , (5)
where φZε is the same angle defined for the Eve’s Z-attack.
Following the action of U ZφZ
ε
/2 on the input states of the
X-basis, we find that they are flipped with probabil-
ity sin2 (φzε/2) = (1− cosφzε) /2, equal to the expression
of qZ1x in Eq.(3). Therefore the unitary transformation
U
Z
φz
ε
/2 determines on the forward channel the same effect
as Eve’s attack. An analogous result is true for the back-
ward path. To evaluate the total QBER QAB, we must
consider the transformations on the X-states for the for-
ward and backward channel,U ZφZ
ε
/2 andU
Z
φZ
η
/2, and both
Alice’s encoding operations, I and iY . In this way we
find the two expression: QZABx(I ) = sin
2(φZε/2 + φ
Z
η/2)
and QZABx(iY ) = sin
2(φZε/2 − φZη/2). This quantities
depend on Alice’s transformation, but if we take the
average between them we find the expression Q
Z
ABx =
(1 − cosφZε cosφZη )/2, exactly equal to Eq.(4) after ex-
pressing the partial QBERs through Eqs. (3).
The simulated eavesdropping described by Eq.(5) is
realized via the two polarization controlling pads on
the fibers connecting Alice and Bob. The Z-attack is
achieved aligning the pads so that the Z-states remain al-
most undisturbed during the propagation. The X-attack
is obtained in a similar fashion. The presence of un-
desired contributions due to Y ,X operators during the
simulated Z-attack are taken into account through a pa-
rameter ∆, which quantifies the distance from a perfect
realization of the unitary transformation of Eq.(5). Once
the two fibers are aligned, we measured the three QBERs
q1, q2 and QAB. A second parameter ξ has been intro-
duced to account for the background noise in the detec-
tion. In Fig.2 we plotted QmAB vs Q
s
AB, i.e. the averages
of the quantities respectively present on the left and on
the right side of Eq.(4) over all the state preparations.
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FIG. 2: Plot of QmAB vs Q
s
AB, as defined in the text. The
experimental points along with their statistical errors are re-
ported as diamonds. The dashed-line represents the relation
given in Eq.(4). The solid-line is drawn by setting the param-
eters, introduced in the text, ∆ = 0.015 and ξ = 0.03. Results
for a uniform random distribution of these parameters in the
ranges [0, 0.03] and [0, 0.06], respectively, are reported as a
contour plot for Nt = 5 × 10
5 simulated trials. The contour
plot represents the frequency of the trials in the bins, equally
spaced with area 0.005 × 0.005 normalized to the maximum.
The dashed-line represents the linear relation given by
Eq.(4). The slightly sloped band is the result of a nu-
merical simulation with values for the parameters ∆ and
ξ reported in caption of Fig. (2).
In order to prove the security of our setup we must
compare the information shared by Alice and Bob with
the one possessed by Eve. It is known [24] that a secret
key can be safely distilled with unidirectional classical
communication if the condition IAB ≥ min[IAE , IBE ] is
accomplished. The average Alice-Bob mutual informa-
tion is given by:
IAB = (IABz + IABx) /2 (6)
where IABi = 1 − h (QABi) with i = (x, z), and h(x) =
x log2(x) + (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy. To
evaluate IAE we need an estimate of Q
Z,X
AE , defined as the
error rate between Eve’s guesses on Alice’s encoding and
Alice’s real encoding. For Eve’s Z-attack, Eq.(1), QZAE
reads:
QZAE =
1
2
− 2
√
q1xq2x (1− q1x) (1− q2x) . (7)
A similar result holds for QXAE. We note that these two
quantities are independent of initial basis preparation,
and depend only on non-orthogonality of Eve’s ancillae.
The average Alice-Eve mutual information is then
IAE = (I
Z
AE + I
X
AE)/2, (8)
where IZ,XAE = 1− h(QZ,XAE). An expression for the mutual
QBER between Bob and Eve, QBE , can be derived in
terms of QAB and QAE using the relation QBE = QAB+
QAE−2QAB ·QAE [11]. The average mutual information
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FIG. 3: Mutual information as function of the QBER QsAB .
The experimental points are reported with their statistical
errors as crossed-rectangles (I¯AB), white-crossed-rectangles
(I¯AE) and gray-crossed-rectangles (I¯BE). The solid lines are
the mutual information with ∆ = 0.015 and ξ = 0.03. Results
ofNt = 5×10
5 simulated trials with the same parameters used
for Fig.2 are reported. The asymmetric imperfection of the
two channels cause the gray area below the lines IAE, IBE .
between Bob and Eve is then expressed as:
IBE = (I
Z
BEz + I
Z
BEx + I
X
BEx + I
X
BEz)/4 , (9)
where I
(Z,X)
BEi = 1− h(QZ,XBEi), with i = (x, z).
In Fig.3 are plotted the curves of mutual information I
according to Eqs.(6), (8) and (9) as function of the quan-
tity QsAB, already defined. We report in the same figure
experimental, numerical and theoretical values. The solid
lines represent our best fit of the experimental data. It
is worthy of note the almost perfect intersection of these
lines for I¯AB , I¯AE and the theoretical (dashed) line at
QsAB ≃ 19%, corresponding to the ≃ 23% of detection
probability in Ref. [11]. Furthermore the curve for I¯BE
is always below I¯AB , implying the security of the scheme
against IIA regardless of the noise on the channel.
In conclusion we reported on the experimental test of
the two-way deterministic protocol for quantum commu-
nication LM05. We modulated the noise on the channel
in such a way as to simulate the disturbance introduced
by Eve’s IIA. By means of independent measurements
of the various involved QBERs we proved the soundness
of Eq.(4) and rated the quality of our setup. With a
subsequent measure we estimated the mutual informa-
tion between Alice, Bob and Eve. Although we did not
perform a direct, contextual, transmission of a string of
bits we believe that the good agreement between experi-
mental data and theoretical predictions presented in this
work witnesses its potential feasibility.
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